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Abstract
This paper considers the efficiency implications of managerial fa-
voritism towards block shareholders of public corporations. While fa-
voritism can take any number of forms (including the payment of green-
mail, diversion of opportunities, selective information disclosure, and the
like), each may have the effect (if not the intent) of securing a block
shareholders loyalty in order to entrench management. Accordingly, the
practice of making side payments is commonly perceived to be contrary to
other shareholders interests and, more generally, inefficient. In contrast
to this received wisdom, we argue that when viewed ex ante, permissi-
ble acts of patronage toward block shareholders may play an important
efficiency role that beneÞts all shareholders alike. We demonstrate that
the prospect of having to share rents with a third party may itself have
a deterrent effect on managerial self-dealing  an off-equilibrium beneÞt
that would not be readily apparent if one looked only at instances where
favoritism actually occurs in practice.
1 Introduction
A central debate in corporate law concerns whether regulation or competition
is best suited to address managerial agency costs in public corporations. While
doctrine has traditionally sided with immutable mandates as a remedy for mis-
aligned incentives, courts and commentators are increasingly placing greater
faith in various market mechanisms to accomplish the task. Output markets,
for example, impose continuous pressure on managers to choose the least cost
methods of production. Labor markets constrain Þrms abilities to increase prof-
its through wage decreases and layoffs. Likewise, reputation markets can play
∗Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Email:
schoi@law.berkeley.edu.
Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School. Email: etal-
ley@law.usc.edu. Thanks to Jennifer Arlen, Jesse Fried, Andrew Guzman, Ehud Kamar,
Un Kyung Park, Mark Ramseyer, and John Yoo for comments and suggestions. All errors
are ours. This paper is a companion piece to a less technical article of ours, entitled Playing
Favorites with Shareholders (July 2001).
1
an important role in deterring managers from engaging in repeat acts of self
dealing.
Of these various mechanisms, however, perhaps none has received more at-
tention than the oft-celebrated market for corporate control as a source of
managerial discipline. By providing a persistent acquisition risk, the takeover
market creates a powerful incentive for managers to constrain their own rapacity
in the interests of self-preservation. Consequently, the argument goes, courts
have little reason to interfere when the market for corporate control remains
active, robust and competitive.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that even those who champion the market
incentives over regulation grow suspicious of practices that stiße competition
in the acquisitions market. One practice that has garnered signiÞcant atten-
tion in this regard is managerial favoritism towards large block shareholders.
Favoritism can take any number of forms: A manager may, for instance, sell
discounted shares to select shareholders, thereby giving preferential rights to
the corporations proÞts. A manager might alternatively seek to divert cor-
porate opportunities and other favorable business prospects toward particular
shareholders. Or, she may seek to procure block shareholders quiescence more
directly, through express payments of cash or property in exchange for their
shares or their acquiescence in a managerial voting trust.
Regardless of its manifestation, the true intent of these apparent acts of
largess is to retard the competitiveness of the acquisitions market, reducing a
block shareholders incentives to mount a takeover, or even to monitor man-
agement very closely. Perhaps accordingly, a number of scholars from both
economics and the legal academy have criticized such practices as inefficient or
morally objectionable. In the context of vote buying, for example, Easterbrook
and Fischel (1984) argue that separating votes from the parties holding the
residual claim on the corporations proÞts will lead to distorted incentives on
the part of managers not to maximize share value. For example, block share-
holders able to sell their votes to managers may do so at the expense of minority
shareholders. The law, as well, prohibits various forms of side payments. The
Delaware Supreme Court has consistently held that non pro rata dividend distri-
butions violate state law Þduciary duties. Recently, the Securities and Exchange
Commission promulgated new rules aimed at curtailing the ability of companies
to disclose information selectively to favored block shareholders.1
In contrast to the conventional wisdom, this paper questions whether man-
agerial favoritism towards select shareholders is necessarily undesirable. We
argue that it is not, and that under plausible conditions, the ability of man-
agers to pay off block shareholders can make all shareholders better off and
managers worse off compared to where side payments are legally prohibited.
Our analysis emanates from a simple observation: While a bona Þde threat of
an acquisition can certainly deter managerial opportunism, executing a takeover
nonetheless requires a substantial investigation and investment on the part of
1 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codiÞed as 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103).
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an outside party. Consequently, except for cases of extreme mismanagement,
potential acquirers might remain on the sidelines, fearing that the payoff from a
takeover does not justify its signiÞcant cost. If, however, investors were allowed
to extract value through favoritism, it would give them an enhanced incentive
to assemble ownership blocks in the Þrst place. Indeed, a large block would now
confer two valuable beneÞts on its owner: (1) a more credible threat to acquire
the Þrm (since the cost of assembling the initial block will subsequently be
viewed as sunk)2; and (2) the ability to use this threat to hold up the manager,
credibly promising a takeover if she is unwilling to render patronage. This latter
option, moreover, requires only that the investor build modest (i.e., less than
controlling) stake in the Þrm, saving her from a more substantial investment
when (as is often the case) the marginal cost of assembling a block of shares
increases with the size of a block.3
However, the enhanced attraction for investors to form toeholds is but half
the story. Anticipating this incentive, a corporate manager must select one of
two (relatively unappetizing) strategies. On the one hand, she could simply
accommodate whatever block shareholders emerge, securing their quiescence
through side payments or other acts of patronage. While acquiescence might
increase the amount of private beneÞts the manager can safely appropriate from
the Þrm,4 it also requires her to share whatever surplus she gleans with oth-
ers. On the other hand, the manager could choose the path of deterrence, so
constraining her own ability to appropriate value as to deter the formation of
any block. In this Article, we argue that under many plausible circumstances,
managers would favor deterrence, preferring to consume all of a small pie than a
meager portion of a large one. In so doing, managers would voluntarily commit
themselves to appropriating even less Þrm value than they would in a world
where favoritism was effectively prohibited (and outside investors had to make
a binary choice between inaction and outright acquisition). Furthermore, in
conventional market settings where multiple outside blocks could potentially
form (each demanding patronage from managers) this incentive to deter entry
by block shareholders grows even stronger. As such, playing favorites with block
shareholders may, ironically, be in all shareholders interests.
Figure 1 helps to tease out the intuition behind our argument. The Þgure
considers the possible strategies of an incumbent manager faced with an outside
investor (i.e., a potential block shareholder) who can assemble a control block
of shares. The horizontal axis illustrated in the Þgure represents the fraction
of Þrm value that a manager ultimately appropriates, and thus ranges between
zero and one. The notation above the horizontal axis represents equilibrium
behavior when side payments are prohibited, while the notation below the axis
2This Þrst beneÞt, of course, would be present even if side payments were not possible.
3 Indeed, investors tend to pay a signiÞcantly larger per share premium as the size of the
block they are purchasing increases. See Part III, infra.
4As our model below demonstrates, even this proposition is questionable. Indeed, if the
manager signiÞcantly increases the amount she appropriates from the Þrm, she might inad-
vertently make it into such a strong takeover target that it is impossible to deter the outside
investor with patronage. See infra __-__.
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Figure 1: Basic Intuitions
corresponds to equilibrium behavior when they are allowed.
When side payments are prohibited (represented by the top portion of the
Þgure), the value xnb represents the equilibrium fraction of value appropriation
that deters a takeover.5 If the manager appropriated any greater value, the
outside investor would Þnd it proÞtable assemble a control block and stage a
takeover, depriving the managers of any beneÞts whatsoever. Conversely, should
manager appropriate up to xnb, no shareholder would Þnd assembling a control
block to be proÞtable. As such, a rational, utility-maximizing manager will
choose the maximal level of x that still deters the outside investor, and thus
would choose x = xnb.
When, conversely, side payments are allowed, the manager must choose be-
tween acquiescence and deterrence. Here, the outside investor may choose to
form a less-than controlling block of shares to extract a side payment. In-
deed, forming such a block is far less costly than an outright acquisition, and
it gives the investor faces a reduced incremental cost to complete a takeover,
which in turn makes the threat of a takeover more credible. If the manager
cuts a deal with the block shareholder (through some sort of side payment), she
both extinguishes the current threat and enhances the chances that no future
takeover can ever occur.6 With the added security of this collusive agreement,
5The subscript nb stands for no bargaining. In the formal model, we assume that x is not
contractible, but rather that the manager can nonetheless tie her own hands by committing
to some upper bound on value dilution.
6 Indeed, once a block of shares is locked up, any subsequent outside investor seeking to
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the manager may increase their level of private beneÞts to a (possibly) higher
level, bx ≥ xnb.7 At the same time, however, the manager will have to share
a portion of these rents with the block shareholder (according to their relative
bargaining strengths).
Anticipating this downstream division of beneÞts, the incumbent manager
might consider an alternative strategy  selecting a more modest level of ap-
propriation, xb, just small enough to dissuade the outside investor from ever
entering the picture. Note that because the investors cost of building a credi-
ble is smaller than engineering a takeover, the manager has to work harder to
deter entry, and therefore xb < xnb. Our analysis demonstrates that for many
plausible ranges of bargaining power between managers and the block share-
holder, managers will prefer to deter the formation of blocks altogether. The
equilibrium level of value diversion is xb, and thus the manager consumes fewer
private beneÞts than she would have if side payments were not allowed.
Others have discussed the relationship between block shareholders and pri-
vate beneÞts of control. Zwiebel (1995), for example, analyzes the incentives of
investors with varying endowments of wealth to distribute their share owner-
ship across Þrms to construct blocks in an effort to capture private beneÞts of
control. Zwiebel, however, takes the level of private beneÞts as exogenous and
does not examine the relationship between the presence of a block shareholder
and the incentive of managers to extract private beneÞts from the corporation.
Stulz (1988) examines the effect of a manager-owned block or blocks in coali-
tion with management on the actions of potential tender offer bidders. Stulzs
model predicts that a larger management-controlled block will result in both a
decreased likelihood of a tender offer bid and an increase in the bid premium.
Stulz, however, does not address the formation of the blocks and the effect of
such blocks on the overall level of private beneÞts.
Macey and McChesney (1985) discuss the beneÞcial effect of greenmail paid
in the context of a change in control to a potential acquirer.8 They argue that
engage in a takeover faces an even larger (or even prohibitive) cost to assemble a control block
than the block shareholder would have in the no-side-payments case.
In the extreme, where managers form alliances with multiple block holders, leaving insuffi-
cient shares in the hands of disperse shareholders to assemble into a control block, managers
effectively cut off the possibility of any takeover.
In the model below, we shall assume that an alliance with the block shareholder renders
infeasible any other takeover attempts. We comment on relaxing this assumption later in the
paper.
7 Interestingly, within our framework, the value of bx never exceeds xnb, except in the
perverse case where the manager is an efficient value appropriator (in the sense that she
values private beneÞts more than the average shareholder values her abstinence).
8 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) provide a similar argument in support of greenmail. They argue
that greenmail allows managers to eliminate a low-value bidder and thereby encourage more
higher value bidders to expend resources investigating a potential takeover target. Greenmail
also provides a target company a credible means to signal to the market that no  White
Knight exists ready to purchase the Þrm, encouraging other potential bidders to expend
resources in preparing a bid.
In contrast, Gordon and Kornhauser (1986) argue against allowing greenmail. They argue
that many forms of greenmail are shareholder-value decreasing. Moreover, Gordon and Ko-
rnhauser argue that distinguishing between different cases of greenmail is difficult for a court
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greenmail beneÞts shareholders because it allows managers to stop a lower-
value bid for the corporation and encourage higher value bidders to enter into
an auction for control. Greenmail also compensates initial tender offer bid-
ders for providing the market with information on proÞtable takeover targets.9
SigniÞcantly, unlike Macey and McChesney, our current argument extends to
situations where the side payment does not help instigate an auction for control.
Managers may enter into a coalition with a block shareholder that prevents an
auction market from ever developing; nevertheless, the prospect of making side
payments as part of the coalition will lead managers to appropriate a lower level
of private beneÞts. As well, irrespective of any information signaling effect from
making a side payment as discussed in Macey and McChesney, the practice of
side payments may enhance shareholder welfare.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses three critical assump-
tions that drive our results. Section 3 then presents a more formal framework
for studying patronage to block shareholders, endogenizing both the decision to
appropriate private beneÞts on the part of a manager and an outside investors
decision to assemble a block of shares. Section 4 characterizes and discusses the
equilibria that emerge from this framework when side payments are prohibited.
Section 5 then characterizes equilibria when side payments are allowed. Section
6 compares the results and discusses possible extensions to the model. Section
7 concludes.
2 Critical Assumptions
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, it is appropriate to state up front
the three critical assumptions that drive our argument. They are as follows.
 Managers can commit ex ante to bind themselves to some maximal value
of appropriation.
Our analysis presupposes that it is possible for managers to commit ex ante
to bind themselves to some upper bound on the fraction of Þrm value they may
appropriate. Although a number of different real-world mechanisms exist to
make this commitment credible, a few examples are especially salient. First,
managers may utilize various corporate governance devices to control the possi-
bility of managerial opportunism. For example, managers may install a board of
directors consisting of outside independent directors with a reputational interest
in monitoring managers. The credibility of such a board over time, moreover,
may be enhanced through the use of a staggered board structure that limits
the ability of managers and shareholders to remove certain directors without
signiÞcant delay. Alternatively, the corporation could employ a conÞdential
voting policy aimed at increasing the willingness of shareholders to vote against
and therefore all greenmail should be prohibited.
9The very act of paying greenmail also sends a credible signal to the market on the man-
agers own perception of the value of the company and thereby may facilitate an auction
market for takeovers. Macey and McChesney (1985).
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management during a proxy contest. Although managers may later attempt to
reverse such corporate governance choices, reversal may be difficult. Reversal,
for example, may send a negative signal to the market reducing share value and
attracting the attention of potential corporate acquirers. Managers may also
commit to certain devices through a corporate charter amendment to reduce
the risk of reversal.
A second means of commitment is to utilize state corporate lawmore directly.
Managers may incorporate the Þrm in a state with more stringent Þduciary duty
standards or weaker derivative suit demand requirements on shareholders. To
the extent reincorporation requires a shareholder vote, managers lose the ability
to exit unilaterally from the state law Þduciary duty protections. Managers
may similarly choose to initiate the process to opt-out of state law antitakeover
devices. State law Þduciary duties also often place great importance on the
status quo. Given the business judgment rule, managers enjoy great leeway
in the amount of private beneÞts they may appropriate from the Þrm. Courts
lack the expertise to assess directly the value of particular managerial decisions.
Once a particular management team chooses to appropriate a particular level
of private beneÞts, however, courts then have a benchmark for the level of
shareholder value possible in the Þrm. To the extent the managers choose to
increase drastically the amount they appropriate from the Þrm resulting in a
large drop in corporate proÞts, courts and shareholders may use this as a signal
that managerial opportunism has increased. Other factors, of course, may cause
a drop in corporate proÞts; nevertheless, the signal may be particularly strong
when a new control block shareholder immune to subsequent takeover assumes
control over the Þrm.
Third, managers may choose to have the Þrm take on a higher level of
debt Þnancing. A greater amount of debt forces the Þrm to pay out its free
cash ßow to the debtholders. To the extent managers seek to avoid Þnancial
distress, managers will then have an incentive to engage in projects that generate
cash ßow instead of projects more geared to their own personal preferences.
Managers, as well, will be forced to pay out this cash ßow to the debtholders
rather than re-invest the cash into a value-reducing project that increases the
managers own welfare.
Fourth, managers may install long-term executive compensation packages
that rely on options and other means of aligning the incentives of managers and
their shareholders. Managers with option-based compensation, for example,
possess a reduced incentive to appropriate private beneÞts of control to the
extent their options suffer a reduction in value as a result.
Finally, managers may enter into long-term contracts with particular cus-
tomers and suppliers that penalize the Þrm for failing to meet certain targets.
For example, a contract with a customer may require the delivery of a set
amount of products at a Þxed quality level. Failure to meet the terms of the
contract may result in a large penalty payment that reduces the amount of value
available for managers to appropriate or places the Þrm at risk of Þnancial dis-
tress. Such a contract may therefore force managers to operate the Þrm at the
minimum level of efficiency necessary to ensure that the customers contract
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terms are met. Managers seeking to appropriate value from the Þrm through
a reduction in work effort, for example, may Þnd a decreased ability to do so
given a long-term supply contract with large penalty terms. Managers that seek
to appropriate value through the diversion of production to their own beneÞt,
as well, may face a reduced ability to make such diversion.
Given the ability to commit to a particular maximum level of private beneÞts,
one might wonder why Þrms leave managers any ßexibility to set the maximum
level. Put another way, why wouldnt the incorporators and promoters of the
Þrm simply pre-commit to the maximum level of private beneÞts at the time
of the initial corporate charter? To the extent private beneÞts of control result
in value transferred from shareholders to managers, the argument goes, share-
holders that initially invest in the Þrm will reduce their willingness to pay for
the Þrms shares. The incorporators of the Þrm may increase the amount they
receive from the initial sale of securities to the public through the adoption of
limits on such private beneÞts.
Thus, if managerial value diversion were inefficient, this reasoning asserts,
the initial charter would prohibit it. While this argument is well taken, we Þnd
it to be of somewhat limited practical usefulness. Indeed, the needs of most
corporations vary over time, and most entrepreneurs lack the ability to predict
with precision the Þrms prospective needs. As such, it is virtually impossible
to design complete governance structures that come close to maximizing Þrm
value far into the future without also allowing for some managerial ßexibility
over governance.10 Of course, this ßexibility may also allow managers to exploit
governance gaps by self-dealing. But we assert it is precisely in such circum-
stances where the market for corporate control becomes an important deterrent.
Our analysis offers insights about how such a market can be made to operate
more effectively, providing durable and continuous beneÞts well after a Þrms
initial public offering.
 The cost of assembling a block of shares increases with the size of the block.
10For example, one method of monitoring managers for private beneÞts of control is to install
a completely independent board of directors. Such a board, however, may not prove optimal
for Þrms where the Þrm seeks to induce investments on the part of managers in Þrm-speciÞc
human capital. Managers that need to make Þrm-speciÞc human capital investments may
fear that ex post, the board acting on behalf of the shareholders may attempt to hold up the
managers. Shleifer and Summers (1988). Installing more managers on the board, therefore,
may work to induce value-increasing investments on the part of managers in Þrm-speciÞc
human capital. Firms, moreover, may not know the importance of Þrm-speciÞc investments
in human capital for their speciÞc situation until well after the initial incorporation and sale
of securities to the public. Likewise, when a Þrm changes its capital mix to include more
debt, it provides a strong incentive on managers to generate free cash ßow and pay this cash
ßow out to the debtholders, reducing the amount available for private beneÞts of control.
For some Þrms with unstable cash ßows, however, the fear of Þnancial distress may counsel
against adopting high levels of debt. More debt for such Þrms may reduce shareholder value
through the costs associated with possible Þnancial distress. Customers, for example, may
choose not to deal with a Þrm near Þnancial distress for fear of reduced product quality or
poor after-purchase support. Moreover, the cash ßow situation of a particular Þrm may vary
after the time of the initial incorporation.
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A central characteristic that drives our arguments below is that for parties
considering assembling a block of shares, shares become marginally more costly
to acquire as the size of the block increases. Put another way, parties face an
upward sloping supply curve for shares. Without an upward sloping supply
curve for shares, managers would lack the ability to appropriate value without
inducing an outside investor to assemble a control block of shares to displace
the managers. To the extent managers appropriate even a marginal amount
of value from the corporation, outside investors beneÞt through the purchase
of all the corporations shares and the displacement of the managers. Faced
with an upward sloping supply curve, on the other hand, outside investors will
not immediately displace managers that appropriate private beneÞts of control.
Instead the outside investors will weigh the cost of assembling a full control block
against the beneÞt from displacing management. Managers that understand this
dynamic, in turn, will appropriate just up to the amount where outside investors
are indifferent with respect to assembling a control block.
SigniÞcantly, in the case where managers are allowed to give side payments
to block shareholders, the upward sloping supply curve gives outside investors
an incentive to assemble small, non-control blocks of shares. Assembling a non-
control block of shares reduces an outside investors remaining cost to assemble
a full control block. An outside investor with a non-control block of shares then
poses an increased takeover threat to managers. In response, managers may
make a side payment to the outside investor, splitting their private beneÞts of
control or, in the alternative, managers may attempt to commit to a lower level
of private beneÞts to deter outside parties from forming a non-control block of
shares in the Þrst place.
Although canvassing the various reasons for an upward sloping supply curve
is beyond our ken for current purposes, such characteristics could emerge under
a variety of circumstances. In our particular model, shareholders face a range
of different tax liabilities for the sale of their shares. Some shareholders may be
non-proÞt organizations and face no tax liability. Other shareholders may hold
shares primarily purchased over one year in the past and therefore enjoy long-
term capital gains preference on any appreciation in their shares. Still other
shareholders may hold shares purchased within one year and face taxation at
ordinary income rates for the appreciation in their shares. Shareholders who
face differential tax liability upon the sale of their shares will require differential
prices to induce them to sell, a trait that leads directly to an upward sloping
supply curve for shares.
We conjecture (but do not prove) that our results are less sensitive to the
exact reason for an upward sloping supply curve than they are to its existence.
Other possible reasons, for example, may explain an upward sloping supply
curve. Shareholders might, for instance, have differential liquidity needs, and
thus may hold out for different prices. Alternatively, shareholders may sub-
scribe to heterogeneous beliefs about the fundamental value of the shares, again
causing the lower valuers to sell Þrst. Regardless of the reason for the increase
in per share cost for outside parties assembling a control block as the block size
grows, the upward sloping supply curve both gives managers the ability to ex-
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tract private beneÞts of control and makes a non-control block a credible threat
of an increased takeover risk.
 The bargaining power of the manager is not too large in relation to that
of the block shareholder.
Key to our theoretical arguments are the terms of the bargain managers
may strike with non-controlling block shareholders. As discussed above, outside
investors may choose to assemble a toehold block precisely to extract a side
payment from managers. Importantly, when the managers suffer from modest
or weak relative bargaining power, they will have to forego a larger portion of
their rents under a collusive transaction, and would therefore favor committing
ex ante to a reduced level of private beneÞts so as to deter the formation of the
block of shares in the Þrst instance.
In contrast, where managers enjoy strong bargaining power relative to the
toehold block shareholder, the managers will have to share only a small propor-
tion of their private beneÞts of control. In such instances, the manager will tend
to prefer collusion to deterrence, and would thereby fail to induce the decreased
equilibrium levels of value appropriation by managers.11
The relative bargaining strength of managers and block shareholders, there-
fore, is pivotal to the papers prescriptive results. Nevertheless, for a wide range
of bargaining power allocations between the non-control block shareholder and
managers, the paper demonstrates plausible conditions under which managers
maximize their welfare by opting for deterrence over collusion. As such, we
contend, scholars, courts, and regulators should take seriously the possibility
that allowing side payments to block shareholders is efficiency enhancing on the
aggregate.
That said, we may now turn to specifying a modeling framework for analyz-
ing the effects of shareholder favoritism, in the form of side payments.
3 Framework and Preliminaries
Consider a business entity (or Þrm) that is controlled by a single, risk-neutral
manager (she), denoted hereinafter as M.12 Following standard convention,
we assume that ownership of the Þrm diverges (at least initially) from control.
In particular, the Þrm is owned not by M, but rather (at least initially) by a
continuum of risk-neutral public shareholders, indexed by τ ∈ [0, 1] , each own-
ing an inÞnitessimal claim dτ on the corporation.13 Although we shall discuss
the shareholders characteristics at greater length below, we suppose throughout
11At the same time, however, within our theoretical framework, so long as value diversion
is inefficient, every equilibrium where bribes are allowed result in weakly less value diversion
by managers.
12Player M might also represent a management team that acts as though it is a uniÞed,
coordinated team. Our analysis in such a case would be virtually identical.
13 It is possible to generalize this framework to assume that each shareholder owns a fraction
g (τ) dτ of the corporation, where g (τ) > 0∀τ , and R 10 g (τ) dτ = 1. We assume that g (τ) = 1
for expositional purposes, however.
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our analysis that no existing shareholder possesses sufficient individual wealth
to engineer a takeover of the Þrm, and, moreover, that coordination costs among
existing shareholders are sufficiently high to rule out group lobbying or effective
proxy contests. Nevertheless, there exists a third party investor and potential
block shareholder (he), denoted hereinafter as B, who begins with no owner-
ship stake in the Þrm but is sufficiently liquid to purchase a non-trivial block of
shares if it is proÞtable for him to do so.14 Should B purchase a sufficient frac-
tion of shares to cross the threshold of control for the Þrm, denoted by c ∈ (0, 1) ,
he can displace M and substitute himself as manager.
Total Þrm value, eV , is realized only at the very end of the model, at which
point the Þrm is liquidated and the proceeds distributed to the shareholders
according to their individual ownership stakes. We assume this value to be
non-contractible.15 Nevertheless, if managed selßessly by M , the the expected
value of the Þrm would be equal to V > 0 dollars. However, the manager is in a
position to expropriate private beneÞts of control in the form of a fraction xM ∈
[0, 1] of the value of the Þrm. Consequently, the expected value of the Þrm in
the presence ofM s value diversion is equal to (1− xM)·V ≡ V.While diverting
value certainly helps the manager, it is nonetheless inefficient. Explicitly, for
each dollars worth of Þrm value she appropriates, the manager is assumed to
beneÞt by µ dollars,16 where 0 < µ ≤ 12 . Consequently, the Þrst best solution
would set xM = 0.
Nevertheless, we assume (for reasons outside the model) that the governance
structure of the Þrm is sufficiently ßexible to permit managerial moral hazard.
Thus, the manager has the tools at her disposal to appropriate up to the entire
value of the Þrm if she so desires. However, the manager is able to take actions
(such as issuing highly-monitored debt, reputational bonding, and the like) that
bound her ex ante ability to expropriate value from above at a level17 denoted
by x ∈ [0, 1] , so that xM ∈ [0, x] . Quite obviously, absent the threat of outside
intervention,M would always want to expropriate as much as she can, and would
therefore be inclined to leave herself unconstrained, at x = 1. But selecting some
x < 1 carries at least two potential advantages for M (explored more formally
below). First, it induces existing shareholders to place greater value on their
existing ownership stakes, thereby increasing the costs of a takeover by B; and
second, the value of x chosen by M also serves to constrain the ability of an
acquirer (i.e., B) to appropriate value, thereby decreasing the potential beneÞts
of a takeover.18 As to this second factor, we assume that after taking over the
14Nothing turns on Bs lack of an initial stake in the Þrm. Our analysis persists when B
also begins with ownership of an inÞnitessimal stake in the Þrm.
15 In order to concentrate on the role of the takeover marketrather than incentive pay
as a device for addressing agency costs, we assume that eV is not contractible, and that the
manager simply receives a ßat wage for her services, normalized without loss of generality to
be zero.
16We bound µ above by 1
2
rather than one for reasons that are explained below. Our
assumptions about existing shareholders in fact require that µ ≤ 1
2
for managerial value
appropriation to be inefficient from an organizational standpoint.
17We assume that this x is chosen endogenously by M in a manner described below.
18This depends, of course, at least in part on the manner in which M commits herself.
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Þrm, B may Þnd that he would like to extract private beneÞts from control.
In particular, subsequent to a takeover, B observes his own marginal beneÞt
of control, denoted by k ∈ [0, 1] drawn from a uniform distribution. For each
dollar B appropriates, B beneÞts by k dollars. B may then choose his own
level of value diversion, denoted by xB ∈ [0, x].19
In order to acquire a control share, B must buy out existing shareholders
who are willing to sell. Quite obviously, then, B would have to offer a price
that is sufficiently attractive to induce the marginal shareholder to cash out now
rather than later. Although the next subsection derives the precise cost function
for assembling various blocks of shares, for current purposes we highlight one
factor (in addition to the expected value of the Þrm) that plays a pivotal role in
shareholders willingness to tender. Each shareholder faces a distinct marginal
tax rate, which we assume (for notational ease) to coincide with the her index
designation, τ ∈ [0, 1] .20 Each shareholder is assumed to begin with a tax basis
of 0, and thus her tax liability on a given payoff z > 0 is equal to τz (once
the payoff is realized for tax purposes).21 Consequently, a shareholder will sell
her shares only if the price offered by B is sufficiently high for her to justify
foregoing the beneÞts of tax deferral, and instead reinvest her after-tax sales
price at the prevailing rate r for one period.22 .
Reiterating, then, our framework can be summarized in the following table:
If she uses various hard mechanisms (such as corporate debentures or durable governance
structures), then acquirors are much more likely to be stuck with the same constraints than
if M used more personal reputational measures to bond.
19For B, of course, this decision of how to set xB is somewhat more complicated than it
was for M , since Bs newly-purchased ownership share gives him a countervailing stock-price
incentive to forebear from expropriating the Þrm. We model this tradeoff more formally below.
20Consequently, this assumption is tantamount to a situation where the marginal tax rate
is 100%, while the bottom is 0%. At the cost of additional notation, one could generalize
our model to assume that τ is distributed on [τ , τ ] ⊆ [0, 1]. However, the core intuitions
we develop below would be substantially the same. We should note, of course, that because
shareholders often differ regarding the basis they may claim in the securities they own, the
continuous distribution of effective marginal tax rates is not a bad approximation.
21 In addition, we shall assume that the potential block shareholder B faces a tax rate of
zero.
22As noted above, we will generally assume throughout what follows that M s marginal
private beneÞts of control are less than one half (i.e., µ < 1
2
). Indeed, µ > 1
2
would correspond
to the (seemingly perverse) case where value diversion by the manager is actually efficiency
enhancing after accounting for gthe tax effects in the text.
To see this, suppose that no block shareholder exists and that M expects to appropri-
ate an x−share of the Þrms value. The present discounted payoff for the manager is
thus V · (µx) / (1 + r) . The payoff of each shareholder holding fraction dτ of the Þrms
V
(1+r)
(1− x) (1 − τ) · dτ . Summing across shareholders, their aggregate after-tax payoff to
is given by
R 1
0
V (1− x) (1− τ)/ (1 + r) · dτ = V
(1+r)
· ( 1−x
2
).Comparing this to the managers
payoff, it is clear that value diversion is efficient on the margin whenever µ > 1
2
. We therefore
exlude this possibility in our analysis. Note that this assumes managers are not taxed on
their private beneÞts. Where managers are taxed (e.g., on higher wage compensation) then
value diversion may be inefficient even when µ > 1
2
.
Obviously, the above deÞnition of efficiency does not take into account any external ben-
eÞts of the tax revenue raised from the shareholders. However, it is an appropriate deÞnition
from the standpoint of organizational design.
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V = Maximal value of corporation (absent any self-dealing)
V = Realized value of corporation (more below...)
xi = Fraction of Þrm value actually converted; i ∈ {M,B}
x = Maximal expropriation level (chosen by M); xi ∈ [0, x]
µ = M s marginal beneÞt for each unit of V converted (µ ≤ 12)
k = Bs marginal beneÞt for each unit of V converted (kU [0, 1])
δ = Bs initial block of shares
γ = Bs Þnal block of shares
c = Minimum fraction of outstanding shares required for control
r = Discount rate for future payoffs
τ = Shareholders type (denoting marginal tax rate)
dτ = Initial inÞnitessimal ownership share of each shareholder
Table I: Summary of Notation
3.1 Shareholder Preferences
Of central importance to both the block shareholder and the manager is the mar-
ket structure of the shareholders, since this determines Bs costs of assembling a
block of shares. In order to analyze meaningfully the managers choices, then,
we must Þrst characterize the structural characteristics of the supply curve
for shares.23 The Þrst step in doing so is to characterize the conditions under
which a shareholder would be willing to tender her shares rather than holding
onto them until the end of the game. Thus, consider a shareholder of type τ who
does not tender. Viewed at the time of her decision, the discounted expected
payoff for such a shareholder is:
E(V ) · (1− τ)
1 + r
· dτ , (1)
where E(V ) denotes the shareholders equilibrium expectation about the even-
tual value of the Þrm.24 In contrast, consider a shareholder who tenders her
ownership claim at per-share price p. The payoff of such a shareholder no longer
turns on her expectations about the value of the Þrm. Instead we assume that
she would reinvest the after-tax purchase price at rate r (also subject to later
capital gains tax). The present-discounted expected payoff for the tendering
shareholder is therefore:25
23As noted above, a key characteristic of this supply curve is that it be upward sloping. We
conÞrm this within our framework below.
24As is conventional, we shall later impose the condition that the shareholders expectations
be part of a rational expectations equilibrium.
25Note that we assume that the shareholder faces the same tax rate for capital gains on the
sale of her shares as for the one period investment return on the sale proceeds. Although
somewhat unrealistic, this assumption simpliÞes the analysis without changing the qualitative
point that shareholders must receive compensation for the loss in tax deferral they experience
when they sell their shares earlier rather than later.
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p · (1− τ) · (1 + r · (1− τ))
1 + r
· dτ (2)
Combining (1) and (2), a shareholder of type τ will sell her shares at per-share
price p if and only if the following condition holds:
p ≥ E(V )
1 + r · (1− τ) (3)
The interpretation of (3) is quite intuitive. It says that the shareholder will
sell her ownership stake if and only if the price offered is sufficiently attractive
to offset the beneÞts of tax deferral. Intuitively, then, the minimal price at
which the shareholder would tender (expressed in the left hand side of the above
inequality) is increasing in E(V ) and τ , but decreasing in r.
The reservation price of a particular shareholder, however, does not yet re-
veal what the market supply curve for the market will look like. To characterize
the latter, note Þrst that (3) is equivalent to the following condition on the
shareholders tax rate τ :
τ ≤ 1
r
µ
(1 + r)− E(V )
p
¶
(Note that the right hand side of the above expression need not be positive,
such as for relatively small values of p or relatively large values of E(V )). Con-
sequently, to derive the market supply curve, one must merely sum up all in-
dividual shareholders who would be willing to tender at price p. Assuming all
shareholders have the same beliefs in equilibrium about the expected value of
the Þrm, the market supply curve is given by:
QS(p) =
Z Max{0, 1r (1+r)−E(V )p }
0
dτ (4)
= Max
½
0,
1
r
µ
(1 + r)− E(V )
p
¶¾
A plot of this supply curve appears below, for r = 0.20, E (V ) = 0.3.
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Note that the supply curve is increasing in price offered, and that a price
of p = E (V ) will induce all shareholders to part with their shares. (Of course,
absent some private beneÞts from control or change in management, it would
never be optimal for someone to offer such a high price, since the present value
of the purchased Þrm would be E(V )1+r < E (V )).
In some of the computations below, it will be helpful to vary this supply
function to account for the possibility that the bidder has already obtained a
δ-block of shares from outside shareholders. Assuming that this existing δ-block
was originally obtained from the lowest tax-rate shareholders,26 the supply curve
will shift back to the following:
QS(p; δ) =Max
½
0,
1
r
·
(1 + r)− E(V )
p
¸
− δ
¾
(5)
(Note that equation (4) is simply a special case of the expression in (5) for the
case of δ = 0).
So suppose that someone owning a δ ≥ 0 fraction of the Þrm wanted to
increase his ownership to γ > δ ≥ 0. The purchaser would have to offer enough
to induce the marginal shareholder of type τ = γ to forego the beneÞts of tax
deferral. He would therefore have to offer a per-share price of27
p(γ) =
E(V )
1 + r · (1− γ) .
All told, then, the cost borne by an existing block shareholder to increase her
fractional holding from δ to γ is given by the following.
26Formally, of course, this conjecture must be veriÞed in the equilibrium portion of the
paper below.
27Note how this amount is independent of δ.
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T (γ, δ) = p(γ) · (γ − δ)
=
µ
E(V )
1 + r (1− γ)
¶
· (γ − δ) (6)
A few details about T (δ, γ) are worth mentioning at this point. Hold-
ing E (V ) constant, note that ∂T∂γ = E (V )
1+r−rδ
(1+r−rγ)2 > 0, making block ac-
quisitions increasingly more expensive at the margin. In fact, note also that
∂2T
∂γ2 = 2
(r+1−rδ)r
(r+1−rγ)3E (V ) > 0, suggesting that the marginal cost of assembling a
block of size γ increases at an increasing rate due to the upward sloping supply
curve. Second, note that T (.) is decreasing in δ, signifying the fact that B
treats his existing toehold as a sunk cost in assessing the incremental cost of
increasing that ownership share to γ > δ. As such, it will cost him less to take
a control share than if he had no toehold.
3.2 Bs Demand-side Preferences
Although we have fully speciÞed the supply side characteristics of the model
(up to E (V )), we have yet to say anything about demand-side characteristics.
For this we need to specify what motivates the block shareholder. To Þll this
in, we suppose that two things motivate B in her purchases of shares. First,
and most obviously, if B purchases an ownership stake in the Þrm, she stands
to earn later rents when the Þrm is liquidated. Thus, purchasing a fractional
share γ in the Þrm will yield a payoff of γ · E (V ) for the block shareholder.
This payoff accrues regardless of whether the block shareholder ever purchases
control of the Þrm.
Second, and as noted above, the block shareholder may also want to ex-
tract private beneÞts of control from the Þrm in the event that she successfully
mounts a control transaction. Recall that the block shareholder observes his
own marginal private beneÞt from control of k ∈ [0, 1] dollars for each unit of
Þrm value that she appropriates, whose realization is learned only after a suc-
cessful takeover. The realized value of k is what determines how, after a control
transaction (i.e., γ ≥ c), the block shareholder will select his own level of value
diversion, xB . In particular, if γ ≥ k, player B would control the Þrm, but would
never choose to expropriate value, since he loses more as an owner than he gains
as an expropriator. In this case, B would set xB = 0, and his payoff is simply be
γ ·E (V ) = γ ·V  the value of her fractional ownership of the enterprise under
efficient management. On the other hand, if k > γ, the insider would willingly
expropriate the maximum possible fraction of Þrm value, setting xB = x. In
this later case, her payoff would be equal to [γ (1− x) + kx]V .28
28Explicitly, it is equal to
γ ·E (V ) + k · (V −E (V )) = γ (1− x)V + kxV
= [γ (1− x) + kx]V .
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3.3 Equilibrium Expectations:
Finally, before pressing on, it is worth taking note that the cost of assembling a
control share (or any other fractional share for that matter) turns critically on
shareholders equilibrium expectations about the expected future value of the
Þrm, or E (V ) . Consequently, it is important to be clear about our assumptions
pertaining to these expectations. Perhaps most natural is to assume that people
share rational expectations about the future value of the Þrm  i.e., their
expectations must square with subsequent equilibrium play, at least given cur-
rent information. Thus, suppose the posited equilibrium involves the manager
retaining control, after which she is expected to appropriate a xM fraction of the
Þrm in the form of private beneÞts. Here, all players must share the following
expectations about the value of the Þrm:
E (V ) = (1− xM) · V .
If, however, the posited equilibrium involves the block shareholder success-
fully amassing a γ ≥ c share, then expectations will shift to reßect the equilib-
rium value of the Þrm under her stewardship. Here, then, the expected value of
the Þrm becomes:
E (V ) = (1− xB) · V ,
Of course, xM and xB may differ from one another, and their values depend on
the equilibrium play of the game. This analysis appears in the ensuing sections.
We now proceed to characterize the equilibrium in the absence and presence of
side payments, ad seriatim.
4 Side Payments Prohibited
We begin by considering the model under the assumption that M and B are
prohibited from negotiating standstill agreements with one another. Assume
the following structure, in which the Þrst two stages take place at an initial
period, t0, and the third and fourth take place at t1, one period later:
1. (Commitment Stage) Player M commits to a maximal value of expropri-
ation x ≤ 1. We assume that x represents the maximal value of expropri-
ation whether M or B controls the Þrm.
2. (Takeover Stage) Player B decides how much of an ownership stake in the
Þrm to purchase denoted by γ ≥ 0. If γ ≥ c, player B assumes control,
but otherwise player M remains as manager.29
3. (Expropriation Stage) ShouldM retain control, she selects a value of xM ∈
[0, x] . Should B obtain control, however, he observes the realized value of
k, and then selects his own value of xB ∈ [0, x] .
29The next section allows B to build an initial toehold ownership share of δ > 0, from
which he may bargain with M for a side payment. Since this section excludes the possibility
of side payments, however, we collapse the toehold purchase and control purchase into one
decision (implicitly assuming that δ = 0). This is done without loss of generality.
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4. (Realization Stage) The Þrm realizes a value equal in expectation to
(1− xi) · V , which is liquidated and distributed to existing shareholders
on a pro rata basis.
To characterize the equilibria of this model, we employ standard backwards
induction techniques. We begin with stage 3 (since stage 4 involve no strategic
choices by the players), and then move back to stages 2 and 1, ad seriatim.
4.1 Expropriation stage:
Beginning with stage 3, suppose Þrst that M has managed to retain control of
the Þrm (that is, B has purchased less than a control share, or γ < c). Now,
M must choose some xM ∈ [0, x] . Her private payoff is equal to µ · xM · V ,
which is obviously maximized at xM = x. And since M has no ownership stake
of the Þrm, her taking of perquisites comes without cost to her. Thus, when
no takeover has occurred, M will maximally expropriate the Þrm, giving her
a payoff measured ex-ante and in terms of present discounted value (PDV) of
V ·
³
1
1+r
´
·µx, and shareholders an aggregate ex ante expected discounted payoff
of V ·
³
1
1+r
´
· (1− x) . In this case, the block shareholder earns only his pro rata
share (if any) of the shareholders aggregate payoff less his now-sunk acquisition
cost of his ownership stake.
Now, suppose instead that B has captured control of the Þrm in stage 3
(that is, γ ≥ c), has observed the realization of k, and now B must choose some
xB ∈ [0, x] . Her private payoff is equal to [γ (1− x) + kx]V ,which constitutes
the sum of her pro rata ownership share and private beneÞts of control. Clearly,
B will set xB = 0 whenever he observes k ≤ γ, since B would gain more on a
pro rata basis by acting selßessly than by expropriating the Þrm. In this case,
Bs payoff consists simply of his pro rata payoff under efficient management, or
γ ·V . On the other hand, if he observes k > γ, B will choose to set xB maximally,
at xB = x, since his marginal private beneÞts now outweigh his marginal pro
rata losses. In this case, Bs payoff consists of the sum of (1) any remaining pro
rata beneÞts (or, γ (1− x)V ), plus (2) his own his private beneÞts of control
(or, kxV ). Just before the realization of k obtains, then, a controlling block
shareholder can expect the following payoff:
E [πB (γ ≥ c)] = Pr (k ≤ γ) ·
£
γ · V ¤| {z }
Pro Rata BeneÞts
+Pr (k > γ) ·
 γ · (1− x)V| {z }
Pro Rata BeneÞts
+E (k|k > γ) · xV| {z }
Private BeneÞts

= (γ) · £γ · V ¤+ (1− γ) · µγ (1− x)V +µ1 + γ
2
¶
· xV
¶
= V ·
µ
γ +
1
2
x (1− γ)2
¶
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Discounted to ex-ante present value, player Bs expected payoff subsequent to a
takeover is equal to V1+r ·
³
γ + 12x (1− γ)2
´
, while player M s payoff is simply
zero.
4.2 Takeover Stage
Given these expected payoffs at the expropriation stage we now back up one
period to consider Bs purchase options at Stage 2, keeping in mind that B
does not know with certainty at this point about the eventual realization of k.
There are three qualitative possibilities to consider, corresponding, respectively
to situations in which B purchase a sub-controlling block of shares, an exact
controlling block of shares, and a super-controlling block of shares.
4.2.1 Case 1: γ < c.
Consider Þrst whether B will purchase a sub-controlling share, or γ < c. In this
case, it is common knowledge that no takeover will occur, and accordingly, Bs
discounted beneÞt for purchasing γ-stake will be γ · E(V )1+r = γ · (1−x)V1+r . The cost
of the purchase would be T (γ, 0) =
³
(1−x)V
1+r(1−γ)
´
· γ. Subtracting the cost from
the beneÞt yields Bs net gain from purchasing a sub-control share:
Φ (γ|γ < c) = γ · (1− x)V
(1 + r)
−
µ
(1− x)V
1 + r (1− γ)
¶
· γ
= −
µ
V · (1− x) · r
(1 + r) (1 + r − rγ)
¶
· γ2 < 0
Notice that this expression is strictly negative for any γ > 0. And thus, the
entire term is maximized at the boundary by setting γ = 0. Consequently, we
know that B would prefer inaction (which gives a zero payoff) over purchasing
shares at any level that falls short of taking control. Intuitively, where B does
not obtain control, B receives the same pro rata value as all other shareholders
based on the managers selection of x. Because B must pay a premium to
assemble even a non-control block of shares due to the upward sloping supply
curve for shares, B suffers a negative return.
4.2.2 Case 2: γ = c.
Second, B can attempt an exact takeover of the Þrm by making a tender offer
for exactly γ = c shares. For an exact takeover, B potentially receives private
beneÞts, and thus the present value of constructing an exact control block of
size c (as derived above) is:µ
1
1 + r
¶
· E [πB (c)] = V ·
µ
1
1 + r
¶
·
µ
c+
1
2
x (1− c)2
¶
The price B offers must be sufficiently large so that the pivotal shareholder of
type τ = c is willing to tender, and is thus given by:
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p (c) = lim
γ→c−
E (V )
1 + r (1− τ) =
V (1− x)
1 + r (1− c)
In deriving the value for E (V ) , recall that for an exact takeover, the marginal
shareholder (of type γ = c) is also the pivotal shareholder, and thus her failure
to tender will cause the takeover to fail, garnering only c − dτ shares for B.
Because this shareholder is pivotal, then, she will realize that if she refuses to
tender, the Þrm will be governed by current management. Thus, the pivotal
shareholder will tender if the price exceeds what she would expect the Þrm to
be worth in the absence of an acquisition.30 As such, Bs cost of purchasing c is
T (c, 0) =
³
E(V )
1+r(1−c)
´
· (c) =
³
V (1−x)
1+r(1−c)
´
· (c). Combining the expected beneÞts
and costs, Bs net gain is given by:
Φ (c) = V ·
Ã
2c+ x (1− c)2
2 (1 + r)
− c (1− x)
1 + r (1− c)
!
, (7)
and thus Player B would prefer an exact takeover over inaction if and only if
Φ (c) > 0.
Note that Φ (c) might be either positive or negative, depending on the value
of x chosen by M. Indeed, when x = 1, (7) reduces to:
Φ (c)|x=1 = V ·
µ
1 + c2
2 (1 + r)
¶
> 0,
implying that B would prefer to mount a takeover. Conversely, if x = 0, Bs
expected net payoff from an acquisition becomes:
Φ (c)|x=0 = V ·
µ −rc2
(1 + r − rc) (1 + r)
¶
< 0,
implying that B would prefer to do nothing. By virtue of the linearity of Φ (c)
in x, there exists a unique value of x that just deters a takeover on the margin.
In particular, M could make B indifferent between inaction and a takeover by
committing to an x = xnb such that Φ (c)|x=xnb = 0. Solving for xnb yields:
xnb =
2rc2
(1− c)2 (1 + r − rc) + 2c (1 + r) , (8)
and thus xnb ∈ (0, 1) . For technical convenience (and without loss of generality),
we assume hereinafter that whenever B is indifferent, he always prefers inaction
to a takeover; and thus, any x ≤ xnb will effectively deter a takeover.
30Note that our analysis implicitly assumes that the block shareholder is able to make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the pivotal shareholder. Where the pivotal shareholder chooses not
to take the offer, for example, the block shareholder may inÞnitesimally increase his offer to
induce the shareholder with the next higher tax rate to sell her shares.
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4.2.3 Case 3: γ > c.
Finally, consider the case where B attempts to acquire γ > c shares. We analyze
this case separately from an exact takeover (where γ = c) because the purchasing
of a super-controlling block of shares has subtler pricing effects. Indeed, unlike
the exact takeover, here the marginal shareholder (type γ = τ) is no longer
pivotal to the takeover. This observation is important, because the marginal (but
not pivotal) shareholder expects the takeover to occur regardless of whether she
tenders, and thus her expected value of the Þrm implicitly presumes a successful
takeover will occur. (Put another way, the marginal shareholder can simply free
ride on any increase in value due to the takeover if she refuses to tender her
shares). Any tender offer on Bs part, therefore, must include an increased
premium to compensate her for the post-takeover expected value of the Þrm.
When γ > c, then, the marginal shareholders expectation of ex post Þrm value
is as follows:
E (V |γ > c) = γV + (1− γ) (1− x)V
= V · (1− (1− γ)x)
Note that this clearly exceeds (1− x)V , the pivotal shareholders expectation
of Þrm value under an exact takeover. Now, the price to acquire from such a
marginal shareholder is equal to:
p (γ) =
E (V )
1 + r (1− τ)
¯¯¯¯
τ=γ>c
=
V (1− (1− γ)x)
(1 + r − rγ)
Note that lim
γ→c+
p (γ) > p (c) , indicating an upward discontinuity of required
price for a super-controlling takeover. This observation should not be terribly
surprising, given that the marginal shareholder must receive compensation for
the beneÞts she would receive from free-riding on Bs acquisition.
All told, then, the net beneÞt of purchasing a greater-than control share
(γ > c) is:
Φ (γ|γ > c) = V
ÃÃ
2γ + x (1− γ)2
2 (1 + r)
!
− (γ)
µ
1− (1− γ)x
1 + r − rγ
¶!
(9)
= V
Ã
−2rγ + x (1− γ) ¡1 + r + γ + rγ2¢
2 (1 + r) (1 + r − rγ)
!
Differentiating with respect to γ conÞrms that this expression is strictly decreas-
ing in γ. Moreover, the limit of Φ (γ) as γ approaches c from above is:
lim
γ→c+
Φ (γ|γ > c) = V
ÃÃ
2c+ x (1− c)2
2 (1 + r)
!
− (c)
µ
1− (1− c)x
1 + r − rc
¶!
(10)
< V ·
Ã
2c+ x (1− c)2
2 (1 + r)
− (c) (1− x)
1 + r (1− c)
!
= Φ (c)
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And thus, not only does Φ (γ) have a downward discontinuity at γ = c, but it
is also a strictly decreasing function in γ thereafter.
Clearly, then, B would never rationally attempt to purchase shares greater
than the minimum necessary for control. Indeed, doing so would require B
to increase discontinuously the premium he pays to all shareholders once a
takeover is certain. Furthermore, Bs incentive to engage in a takeover in part
rests with Bs ability to appropriate potentially his own private beneÞts. Bs
ability to appropriate private beneÞts does not increase with block size once B
has obtained control over the Þrm. In contrast, as Bs share ownership increases
past c, B will bear more of the cost of appropriating private beneÞts, reducing
the likelihood that B will in fact proÞt from the possibility of such beneÞts.
4.2.4 Synthesis
As the above analysis makes clear, Bs expected net payoff, Φ (γ) is strictly
decreasing for all γ < c, discontinuous at γ = c, and strictly decreasing once
again for all γ > c. Consequently, the only actions that B can plausibly take
are (1) to purchase nothing at all (γ = 0), or (2) to engineer an exact takeover
(γ = c). Drawing on the analysis from subsection 4.2.2 above, then, we arrive
at following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose M has previously committed to a maximal level of value
expropriation, x. The unique equilibrium of the Takeover-Stage subgame
is as follows:
 If x ≤ xnb, B will purchase no shares whatsoever, yielding respective
payoffs for M and B of:
(πM ,πB) =
µ
µxV
1 + r
, 0
¶
.
 If x > xnb, B will make a successful tender offer for exactly c shares,
at price p = (1−x)V1+r−rc , yielding payoffs of:
(πM ,πB) = (0,Φ (c)) .
4.3 Commitment Stage
Finally, consider the initial stage of the game where M commits to a maximal
level of appropriation, x. Recall from the previous subsection that the managers
payoff is:
πM (x)
(
µxV
1+r if Φ (c) ≤ 0
0 else
Clearly, then, M would like to select the largest value of x that still makes
a takeover unproÞtable to B. Equivalently, M will choose the largest x that
ensures Φ (c) ≤ Φ (0) = 0. As demonstrated above, this value is given by x =
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xnb, where xnb is given by (8). The plot of xnb appears below, as a function of
r and c:
0
1
Control Threshold (c)
0
1
Discount Rate (r)
0
0.5
Xnb
Figure 3
Simple differentiation immediately yields the result that xnb is strictly increas-
ing with c and r, so that xnb reaches a maximal value of 12 at r = c = 1.
Higher levels of c both increase the cost to B from purchasing a control block of
shares and reduce the likelihood that B will proÞt from his own private beneÞt
appropriation once in control. Higher levels of r, in turn, reduce the present
discounted value to B of obtaining control over the Þrm (note that Þrm value is
realized only at the end of the model). Managers faced with increased levels of
c or r may therefore raise the maximal level of expropriation xnb to which they
commit without incurring a takeover, all other things being equal.
4.4 Equilibrium
Having constructed the equilibria for each proper subgame, we are now in a
position to state more precisely the equilibrium of the entire game when side
payments are prohibited. This statement is embodied in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies and payoffs
for the game in which side payments between M and B are prohibited are
as follows:
 Commitment Stage: Player M commits to an upper bound on ex-
propriation at x = xnb = 2rc
2
(1−c)2(1+r−rc)+2c(1+r) , which is strictly
increasing both in the required control threshold ( c) and in the rate
of discounting ( r).
 Takeover Stage: Player B purchases no shares (i.e., γ = 0), and thus
M retains control.
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 Expropriation Stage: Player M expropriates the maximal amount pri-
vate beneÞts, setting xM = xnb,
 Realization Stage: The total realized value of the Þrm is equal to
V · (1− xnb) .
 The expected payoffs of the parties are:
Initial SHs
R 1
0
V ·(1−xnb)·(1−τ)
1+r dτ =
V
(1+r) ·
¡
1
2 − xnb2
¢
Player M µV(1+r) · xnb
Player B 0
Aggregate Surplus V(1+r)
¡
1
2 − xnb
¡
1
2 − µ
¢¢
Proposition 1 makes clear the deterrent beneÞts of the market for corporate
control. Representing a persistent threat of a takeover for self-serving managers,
the block shareholder provides an incentive for the manager to regulate her own
ability to appropriate value. Indeed, in the game without side payments, the
manager places a voluntary cap on her own ability to appropriate value at xnb
in order to deter entry by B. In turn, this voluntary constraint works in the
interests of existing shareholders, and of economic efficiency.31
5 Side Payments Permitted
As noted in the introduction, the practice of favoritism towards block share-
holders is conventionally viewed with great suspicion, as an overt attempt to
undermine the disciplining forces of the takeover market studied above. To eval-
uate this claim, we switch gears in this section to consider how the predictions of
the model might change if the players were allowed to bargain with one another,
and the manager could make a side payment to the block shareholder in order to
secure her acquiescence and complicity. We Þnd, contrary to received wisdom,
that permitting such side payments may (in many plausible circumstances) tend
to have a salubrious effect on aggregate corporate welfare.
In order to analyze the effects of side payments, we introduce two additional
stages into the existing framework, expanding the game so that it now has six
stages, the Þrst four of which take place at t0, with the Þnal two occurring at
t1, after one period elapses.
1. (Commitment Stage) Player M decides whether to commit to a maximal
x, and if she so chooses, she selects some value from [0, 1] . We again
assume that x represents the maximal value of expropriation whether M
or B controls the Þrm.
2. (Toehold Stage) Player B decides whether to amass a toehold in the Þrm,
denoted by δ. If δ ≥ c, player B assumes control, and the game skips to
step (5) below.
31Note once again that value appropriation by the manager will be inefficient only if µ ≤ 1
2
,
as per our earlier assumption.
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3. (Bargaining Stage) PlayersM and B bargain over a possible side payment
to B, which would allowM to retain control. We suppose that the players
bargain over the available surplus according to the Nash (1950) program
with respective bargaining powers θ for M and (1− θ) for B, where θ ∈
[0, 1] .
4. (Takeover Stage) Should no bargain be struck in (3), player B decides
whether to increase his holdings in the Þrm to γ ≥ δ. If γ ≥ c, player B
assumes control, and otherwise player M remains as manager.
5. (Expropriation Stage) ShouldM retain control, she selects a value of xM ∈
[0, x] , and pays B the amount (if any) contracted for earlier. Should B
obtain control, however, he observes the realized value of k, and then
selects his own value of xB ∈ [0, x] .
6. (Realization Stage) One period passes, and the Þrm realizes an expected
value of (1− x) · V , which is subsequently liquidated and distributed to
existing shareholders on a pro rata basis.
Note that in addition to the bargaining stage (stage 3), we have also in-
troduced an initial investment stage (stage 2), where B can build a toehold
from which to bargain. It is the possibility of this toehold stage that allows
B to extract additional rents, because it allows her to reduce the incremental
cost of completing a takeover, thereby becoming a credible bargainer withM .32
We once again employ standard backwards induction techniques to characterize
the subgame perfect equilibrium. We begin once again with the penultimate
expropriation stage, and then work backwards.
5.1 Expropriation stage
This stage is virtually identical to its analog in the no bargaining game above. As
before, when no takeover has occurred (i.e., γ < c), M maximally expropriates
the Þrm, setting xM = x, which yields an ex ante payoff of V ·
³
1
1+r
´
· µx.
Conversely, if B captures control of the Þrm (that is, γ ≥ c), he will receive a
payoff of [γ (1− xB) + kxB]V , and will set xB = x if and only if k < γ, and
will otherwise set xB = 0. Viewed one period earlier (and before the realization
of k is known), the expected payoff for an acquiring player B is therefore equal
to V ·
³
1
1+r
´
·
³
γ + 12x (1− γ)2
´
.
5.2 Takeover Stage
In light of these expropriation payoffs, we now move back to consider the
takeover decision. Thus, suppose that M has set x, that B has amassed some
32 It is theoreticlaly possible to include a toehold stage in the version of the game where side
payments are prohibited. Doing so, however, adds nothing to the analysis, since no strategic
interactions would separate the toehold from the takeover stage.
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δ ∈ [0, c) share of the Þrm, that bargaining has failed, and that B is now con-
sidering increasing her ownership stake to γ ≥ δ.
Although we relegate most of the majority of the technical analysis to the
appendix, worth highlighting the particular case where B executes an exact
takeover, increasing his holdings from δ to exactly γ = c. The incremental gain
to B (over the status quo) from such a purchase is:
Incremental Gain = V ·
Ã
2c+ x (1− c)2
2 (1 + r)
− δ (1− x)
(1 + r)
!
(11)
Note that this incremental gain is smaller than the analogous gain of V ·³
2c+x(1−c)2
2(1+r)
´
in the no-bargaining case, where the outside investor did not al-
ready possess the value of the toehold shares. However, the incremental cost of
engineering a takeover also contains a sunk component. Given that the marginal
tenderer is pivotal, equilibrium expectations of Þrm value are E (V ) = (1− x)V
if the pivotal shareholder does not tender (since the tender offer will fail). Hence,
the cost of buying control starting from a toehold of δ is:
T (c, δ) = V ·
µ
(1− x)
1 + r − rc
¶
(c− δ), (12)
which is also decreasing in δ. Summing expressions (11) and (12), the net in-
cremental beneÞt to B of increasing his sub-control share (δ) to a control share
(c) is equal to:
Ω (c, δ) = V ·
Ã
2c+ x (1− c)2
2 (1 + r)
− δ (1− x)
(1 + r)
!
− V ·
µ
(1− x)
(1 + r − rc)
¶
(c− δ)
= Φ (c) + V · δ
µ
(1− x) rc
(1 + r − rc) (1 + r)
¶
Note that Ω (c, δ) is strictly increasing in δ, indicating that the sunk cost
component of starting from a toehold swamps the sunk beneÞt component. This
observation is signiÞcant, because it means the incremental cost of a takeover
goes down with a toehold by even more than does the incremental gain. Hence, if
a takeover is proÞtable without any existing toehold, it must always be proÞtable
with one. As such, B may be able to make his later bargaining position stronger
by Þrst obtaining a toehold, whereupon his cost of building the toehold is sunk.
(We return to this consideration shortly).
Comparing this payoff to those of other possible actions by B yield the
following Lemma, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. Suppose that B has an installed toehold of δ shares, and M has
committed to a maximal level of value expropriation, x. The unique equi-
librium of the Takeover-Stage subgame is as follows:
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 If Ω (c, δ) > 0, B engineers a takeover by purchasing exactly γ = c shares
at price p (c) = V ·
³
(1−x)
1+r−rc
´
. In this case, the parties continuation
payoffs are:
(πM ,πB) = (0,Ω (c, δ)) .
 If Ω (c, δ) ≤ 0, B does not engineer a takeover, and instead simply remains
at γ = δ. In this case, the parties continuation payoffs are:
(πM ,πB) =
µ
µxV
1 + r
, 0
¶
.
5.3 Bargaining Stage
Inducting backwards one stage further, suppose now that B has built a toehold
of δ, but has yet to engineer a takeover attempt, and is allowed to bargain with
M about a standstill agreement. The parties ability to reach an agreement
turns crucially on whether there are any gains from trade available. This will
not always be the case, since in some situations Bs continuation payoff from
forging ahead with a takeover is non-positive, and thus he is not a credible
bargainer. In other situations, Bs takeover payoff is so large that it exceeds
M s own private beneÞts, and thus M is not a credible bargainer. Nevertheless
when Bs takeover payoff is positive but still less than M s private beneÞts,
bargaining will occur. We consider each possible case, ad seriatim.
Suppose Þrst that Ω (c, δ) ≤ 0. Here, the parties continuation payoffs are
(πM ,πB) =
³
µxV
1+r , 0
´
, and B does not pose a credible threat to appropriate.
Consequently, since M has no reason to fear a subsequent takeover, she will
refuse to bargain.33 In this case, then, the status quo prevails and the parties
simply receive the continuation payoffs noted above.
Suppose instead that Ω (c, δ) > µxV(1+r) , so that B earns more from a takeover
than M can earn from the status quo. Here as well, there are no gains from
trade available since there exists no payment that prevents a takeover and also
leaves M with a nonnegative payoff. Consequently, bargaining fails and the
parties receive continuation payoffs associated with a takeover of (πM ,πB) =
(0,Ω (c, δ)) .
Finally, consider the case where 0 < Ω (c, δ) ≤ µxV(1+r) , so that in the absence
of bargaining a takeover will occur, but M stands to lose more than B gains
in the process. Here there are gains from trade available with a negotiated
outcome in which M pays B to stand down from any future takeover attempt.
Under the Nash bargaining protocol with bargaining shares θ forM and (1− θ)
for B, M s post-bargaining payoff is equal to:
(θ) ·
µ
µxV
(1 + r)
− Ω (c, δ)
¶
33We assume implicitly, of course, thatM cannot sell his job to B. Thus, the only mechanism
by which B can gain control is through a tender offer (in which caseM is cut out of the picture
entirely).
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Analogously, Bs bargaining payoff (when her share of the surplus is added to
her reservation value) is given by:
θ ·Ω (c, δ) + (1− θ) · µxV
(1 + r)
Summarizing the bargaining stage, then, the following equilibrium payoffs
emerge (as functions of Ω (c, δ)) :
(πM ,πB) =

³
µxV
(1+r) , 0
´
⇔ Ω (c, δ) ≤ 0 θ · h µxV(1+r) −Ω (c, δ)i ,
θ ·Ω (c, δ) + (1− θ) · µxV(1+r)
 ⇔ Ω (c, δ) ∈ ³0, µxV(1+r)i
(0,Ω (c, δ)) ⇔ Ω (c, δ) > µxV(1+r)
Notice that only when Ω (c, δ) > µxV(1+r) does a takeover actually occur in equilib-
rium at this stage. Notice also that as Ω (c, δ) becomes crosses zero, Bs payoff
increases and M s decreases discontinuously. Whether M will allow B to reach
this threshold is therefore an important question.
5.4 Toehold Stage
Suppose now that the manager has set x, and B is deciding about how large of
a toehold to purchase. As before, it is useful to consider the same three regions
as those explored above:
5.4.1 Case 1: Ω (c, δ) ≤ 0.
Consider Þrst the case where Ω (c, δ) ≤ 0, and thus there is no takeover threat.
Because Ω is increasing in δ, for any δ > 0 it must also be true that Ω (c, 0) =
Φ (c) < 0, which will constitute our starting point in determining whether there
is any incentive to increase δ beyond δ = 0.
First, we ask whether it pays for B to purchase some δ size block of shares
such that Ω (c, δ) remains non-positive, and thus a takeover is not credible. If
B makes such a purchase, it is clear from the above that bargaining will not
occur, M will retain control, and Bs continuation payoff will be zero. Thus Bs
sole beneÞt is the pro rata market value of his purchase (assuming M retains
control), or,
³
(1−x)V
(1+r)
´
·δ. This beneÞt comes at a cost of p (δ)·δ =
³
(1−x)V
1+r(1−δ)
´
·δ,
so that the net beneÞt of this non-threatening toehold purchase is equal to:µ
(1− x)V
(1 + r)
¶
· δ −
µ
(1− x)V
1 + r (1− δ)
¶
· δ = −δ2
µ
r · (1− x)
(1 + r − rδ) (1 + r)
¶
· V
Since this expression is negative for all δ > 0, B strictly prefers inaction to
purchasing a non-threatening toehold that falls short of making him a credible
bargainer with M .
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5.4.2 Case 2: Ω (c, δ) > µxV(1+r) .
Now suppose that for some δ ≥ 0, we have Ω (c, δ) > µxV(1+r) . In this case,
there will be no bargaining, since Bs takeover payoff of Ω strictly exceeds M s
non-takeover payoff. Given that a takeover is inevitable in this region, any
toehold that B wished to build would cost him34 (1−x)V1+r−rc · δ. As such, the payoff
associated with a toehold purchase of δ in this region is:
Ω (c, δ)− T (δ) + (1− x)V
(1 + r)
· δ (13)
= V ·
Ã
2c2 +
¡
1− c2¢x
2 (1 + r)
− δ (1− x)
1 + r
!
−
µ
(1− x)V
1 + r − rc
¶
· (c− δ)
− (1− x)V
1 + r − rc · δ +
(1− x)V
(1 + r)
· δ
= V ·
Ã
2c2 +
¡
1− c2¢x
2 (1 + r)
− c (1− x)
1 + r (1− c)
!
= Φ (c) .
Note that this expression does not depend on δ. This observation comports well
with ones intuation: Once Ω (c, δ) > µxV(1+r) , a takeover is inevitable. Conse-
quently, B is indifferent between proceeding with a takeover at the initial stage,
or waiting for the second purchase opportunity. We shall assume arbitrarily
(but without loss of generality) that when B is indifferent, he puts it off a
takeover as long as possible.35 Thus, once Ω (c, δ) > µxV(1+r) , there is no incentive
for B to increase δ any further.
5.4.3 Case 3: Ω (c, δ) ∈
³
0, µxV(1+r)
i
.
Finally, suppose that for some δ ≥ 0, we have 0 < Ω (c, δ) ≤ µxV(1+r) . In this case,
as shown above, bargaining would occur between M and B. Our Þrst question
is whether B has an incentive to purchase a sufficient toehold to make himself a
credible bargainerthat is, so that Ω (c, δ) is just positive. We then turn to ask
whether B would have any incentive to increase his toehold even further within
this region.
Consider Þrst whether there is sufficient incentive forB to purchase a toehold
δ sufficient to push him into this regioni.e., just past the point where Ω (c, δ) =
0. So doing would exploit a discontinuity in Bs payoff function, because B
34This computation assumes equilibrium expectations of a later control purchase at γ = c,
and pricing for the pivotal shareholder.
35On a similar note, Bris (2000) presents evidence from a sample of tender offers in the
United States from 1985 to 1998 that only 3.2 percent of the bidders had a prior toehold
stake. Bris hypothesizes that assembling a toehold prior to a bid signals to the market the
possibility of a takeover and thereby may lead to a run-up in the secondary market price,
making the purchase of subsequent shares in the target more expensive for the bidder and
decreasing the probability of a successful takeover.
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would now becomes a credible bargainer with M and can extract a portion of
M s rents. DeÞning δc as the value of δ which solves the equation Ω (c, δ) = 0,
we obtain the following36:
δc =
2c2r − x
³¡
1 + c2
¢
(1 + r)− (1− c)2 (rc)
´
2rc (1− x)
 (14)
(Note that this value is interior only if x ≤ xnb. Indeed, if x > xnb, then
Ω (c, δ) > 0 for all values of δ. Thus, when x > xnb, player B need not amass
any toehold to have credibility as a bargainer, and δc = 0).
Thus, if B sets δ inÞnitesimally above37 that speciÞed in (14),then he will
ensure himself of an approximate net continuation beneÞt through bargaining
of:
Ω (c, δc) + (1− θ) ·
µ
µxV
(1 + r)
−Ω (c, δc)
¶
= (1− θ)µ ·
µ
xV
(1 + r)
¶
> 0
At the same time, however, Bs toehold purchase comes at a cost. Assuming
Bs equilibrium strategy is to purchase just enough shares to become a credible
bargainer (i.e., inÞnitesimally more than δc), then it will be common knowledge
that no takeover will ever occur, since B will be simply paid off by M once he
obtains a credible toehold. Thus, as B is purchasing his toehold, the markets
expectation of Þrm value will remain at (1− x)V , and thus the price of pur-
chasing δc is equal to p (δc) = V ·
³
(1−x)
1+r(1−δc)
´
. Netting out the pro-rata beneÞt
of buying a δc share of the Þrm, then, the net cost of purchasing the toehold is:
T (δ)− (Pro Rata Ben.) =
µ
(1− x)V
1 + r − rδc
¶
· δc −
µ
(1− x)V
(1 + r)
¶
· δc (15)
= (1− x)V ·
Ã
r · (δc)2
(1 + r − rδc) (1 + r)
!
> 0
Let xb denote the value of x that equates the beneÞts and costs of such a
purchase, thereby making B indifferent. Solving for xb yields:
xb = 2c
2r ·
λrc − µ (1− θ) (1 + r − rc) ·
µr³
1 + 2(1+c
2)(1+r)
µ(1−θ)(1+r−rc)
´
− 1
¶
(λrc)
2 − 2µ (1− θ) rc (1− c)2 (1 + r − rc)

(16)
36Here, even though it is hypothetical (that is, off the equilibrium path), we use the pivotal
sharholder (τ = c) to characterize the pricing rule for moving from δ to c.
37We say inÞnitesimally above because of the underlying behavioral assumption that
when B is indifferent, he will not engineer a takeover. Thus, to be a credible acquiror, B must
amass slightly above δc, though we can approximate the equilibrium arbitrarily close by using
the exact value of δc.
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where λrc ≡ (1− c)2 (1 + r − rc) + 2c (1 + r) .
Perhaps the most salient question for current purposes concerns the relation-
ship between the xb computed above and xnb, the value that deters a takeover in
a world without bargaining. Lemma 3 (whose proof appears in the Appendix)
describes this relationship:
Lemma 3 The commitment level that deters a takeover when bargaining is pro-
hibited, xnb, is strictly greater than the unique commitment level that de-
ters the entry of a block shareholder when bargaining is allowed, xb.
The intuition behind this lemma is relatively simple. When bargaining is
allowed, an outside investor contemplating an acquisition will consider not only
the beneÞt of engaging in a takeover, but also the possibility of extracting
rents from the manager under the threat of a takeover. Because even a modest
toehold can render this latter holdup threat a credible one, B can capture
rents with only a de minimis investment. Consequently, the manager must
work even harder to deter this lower-cost form of entry, choosing xb < xnb. It is
important to note, however, that Lemma 3 does not predict that M will always
choose to deter entry; rather, it states that should she decide to do so, she will
commit to a lower ceiling on private beneÞts than she would if bargaining were
prohibited. (We defer until the next subsection the question of whether M will
favor deterrence over acquiescence).
A plot of xb as a function of c appears below for the case of r = 1/5, µ = 2/5,
and θ = 1/2. (On the same graph, xnb is shown for the same parameter values
in a gray perforated line).
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Generalizing to three dimensions (for the case of µ = 2/5 and θ = 1/2), the
plot appears as follows. Also appearing on the graph is xnb (represented by the
higher manifold).
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Consider now whether B has any marginal incentive to increase his sub-
control toehold even further within this region. On Þrst blush, this might seem
like a good strategy for B, since he can perhaps capture a larger fraction of
the surplus by moving the lower end of the bargaining range upwards. As it
turns out, however, this would never be in Bs interests. To see why, consider
a value of δ that is arbitrarily close to (but inÞnitesimally larger than) δc, so
that Ω (c, δ) > 0. Recall that the post-bargaining beneÞts that B will obtain
in this subregion is
³
θ ·Ω (c, δ) + (1− θ) · µxV(1+r)
´
, while the the total cost38 of
amassing δ shares to begin with is
³
(1−x)V
1+r−rδ
´
· δ. Subtracting the latter from the
former yields Bs net beneÞt:
θ ·
·
Φ (c) + V · δ
µ
(1− x) rc
(1 + r − rc) (1 + r)
¶¸
+ (1− θ) · µxV
(1 + r)
−
µ
(1− x)V
1 + r − rδ
¶
· δ
Differentiating this expression with respect to δ yields Bs net marginal beneÞt
from building a toehold in this region:
θ · (1− x)V
µ
rc
(1 + r − rc) (1 + r)
¶
− (1− x)V
Ã
(1 + r)
(1 + r − rδ)2
!
=
(1− x)V
(1 + r)
·
"µ
θrc
(1 + r − rc)
¶
−
µ
1 + r
1 + r − rδ
¶2#
< 0
Bs post-bargaining proÞt is therefore strictly decreasing in δ, and hence it
is never optimal for B any more shares at the toehold stage than is necessary to
38This cost is derived assuming that no takeover will occur in equilibrium. Indeed within
this region, M and B merely bargain to a standstill agreement, and thus no takeover occurs.
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be a credible bargainer (that is, inÞnitesimally more than δc). Intuitively, the
principal gain to B from expanding a toehold derives from the increased proÞt
B would obtain from a takeover launched after B assembles the toehold. As
part of Nash bargaining,M must compensate B for the increased takeover proÞt
available once B owns a toehold. The compensation to B, however, necessarily
reduces the surplus remaining for M and B to divide. To the extent B has
some bargaining power, B will therefore expect a reduced amount of surplus
due to his larger toehold. Therefore, for each $1 that B expends in increasing
his toehold during the toehold stage, B will expect $1 more in compensation for
Bs foregone takeover proÞts as well as $ (1− θ) less in surplus in the negotiation
stage, leading B to expect a net loss.
5.4.4 Summary of Toehold Stage
From the above arguments, it is clear that equilibrium play of the toehold stage
hinges crucially on the value of Ω (c, 0) = Φ (c)  i.e., the expected takeover
payoff starting from a zero toehold. If, on the one hand, Φ (c) ≤ 0 (a condition
that is equivalent to x ≤ xnb), then whether B builds a toehold turns on a
comparison of x to xb:
 If x ≤ xb, then B builds no toehold, never engineers a takeover, and the
payoffs of the parties will be:
(πM ,πB) =
µ
µxV
(1 + r)
, 0
¶
 If x > xb, B will build a toehold of (inÞnitesimally more than):
δc =
2c2r − x
³¡
1 + c2
¢
(1 + r)− (1− c)2 (rc)
´
2rc (1− x)
 .
B and M will negotiate a standstill agreement, and the parties resulting
payoffs will be
(πM ,πB) =
µ
θ · µxV
(1 + r)
, (1− θ) · µxV
(1 + r)
− (δc)2
µ
r · (1− x)
(1 + r − rδc) (1 + r)
¶
· V
¶
If, on the other hand, Φ (c) > µxV(1+r) , B will take over the Þrm with no
bargaining, and the parties payoffs will be
(πM ,πB) = (0, Φ (c))
Finally, if Ω (c, 0) = Φ (c) ∈
³
0, µxV(1+r)
i
, B will build no additional toehold,
M will retain control, and the parties will bargain to a standstill agreement,
such that their respective payoffs are equal to:
(πM ,πB) =
µ
θ ·
·
µxV
(1 + r)
−Φ (c)
¸
, θ · Φ (c) + (1− θ) · µxV
(1 + r)
¶
.
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5.5 Commitment Stage
With the toehold, bargaining, takeover, expropriation, and realization stages all
accounted for, we now consider the commitment stage of the game. Building
on the results from the previous subsection, we once again consider three cases.
Note that the regions studied above and below turn on the value of Ω (c, 0) ≡
Φ (c) , which recall is deÞned as:
Φ (c) = V ·
Ã
2c+ x (1− c)2
2 (1 + r)
− c (1− x)
1 + r (1− c)
!
SigniÞcantly, this is itself a function of the maximal level of expropriation, x.
Thus, it is necessary to remain mindful throughout about what values of x are
required to support the regions analyzed.
5.5.1 Case 1: Φ (c) ≤ 0⇔ x ≤ xnb
Consider Þrst the case where Ω (c, 0) = Φ (c) ≤ 0, corresponding to a situation
where x ≤ xnb. Recall that when bargaining is not allowed, Φ (c) ≤ 0 is sufficient
to ensure that no takeover would occur. But when side payments are allowed,
M has to worry about the possibility that B will purchase just large enough of
a toehold to make Ω (c, δc) positive, thereby affording him with the credibility
to hold up M for a side payment.
Consequently, within this region, the manager has essentially two options.
First, she might attempt to set x low enough to circumvent any such toehold
entry by B. As was noted above, this option would entail setting x = xb < xnb.
Should M choose this route, the parties respective payoffs will be equal to:
(πM ,πB) =
µ
xb · µV
(1 + r)
, 0
¶
Alternatively, of course, M can simply accommodate entry and split the
proÞts with B. If she opts for this route, then B will purchase inÞnitesimally
more than δc, so that his takeover threat remains credible. When this hap-
pens, B will be able to capture a (1− θ) share of M s rents, leaving M with
a corresponding payoff of θ · x · µV(1+r) . Clearly, then, if the manager chooses
accommodation, she will want to set x as high as possible within this region, at
x = xnb, so as to maximize her post-bargaining rents at:
θ · xnb · µV
(1 + r)
.
Comparing the two payoffs above, the optimal choice of x within this region is
as follows:
x =
½
xb if xb ≥ θ · xnb
xnb else
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5.5.2 Case 2: Φ (c) > µxV(1+r) ⇔ x > bx > xnb
Now consider the case where Φ (c) > µxV(1+r) , a contingency that is equivalent to:
x > bx = 2rc2
(1− c)2 (1 + r − rc) + 2c (1 + r)− 2µ (1 + r − rc) > xnb (17)
Note Þrst that M would never rationally choose to set x > bx.39 Indeed, so
doing would simply induce B to take over the Þrm without bargaining, thereby
leavingM with a zero payoff. In such a situation, the players respective payoffs
would be:
(πM ,πB) = (0, Φ (c))
Because she receives a zero payoff everywhere in this subregion,M is indifferent
about where she sets x ∈ (bx, 1]. We will assume in such a situation, however,
that if M is forced to select an x in this region, her personal indifference leads
her to do the best thing for shareholders, and M will thus set x arbitrarily close
to the lower boundary of this region, bx.
Clearly, however, this subregion is never an equilibrium, since M always
can always select a smaller x and earn a strictly positive payoff. In particular,
if possible, M would like to avoid this region by setting x such that either
Φ (c) ≤ µxV(1+r) or, even better, Φ (c) ≤ 0. We return to this question at the
summary of this stage, below.
5.5.3 Case 3: Φ (c) ∈
³
0, µxV(1+r)
i
⇔ x ∈ (xnb, bx]
Finally, consider the case where 0 < Φ (c) ≤ µxV(1+r) , and thus M has set x ∈
(xnb, bx] . Here, bargaining occurs, after B builds only a minimal toehold, and
M pays B not to take over the Þrm. As noted above, the payoffs for the players
will be:
(πM ,πB) =
µ
θ ·
·
µxV
(1 + r)
−Φ (c)
¸
, θ ·Φ (c) + (1− θ) · µxV
(1 + r)
¶
hence, in this region, M would like to set x in such a way that maximizes
θ ·
h
µxV
(1+r) −Φ (c)
i
. Recalling once again that:
Φ (c) = V ·
Ã
2c+ x (1− c)2
2 (1 + r)
− c (1− x)
1 + r (1− c)
!
,
M will choose x so as to maximize the non-negative quantity:
θ·
"
rc2
(1 + r − rc) (1 + r) + x
Ã
2µ (1 + r − rc)− (1− c)2 (1 + r − rc)− 2c (1 + r)
2 (1 + r) (1 + r − rc)
!#
,
39Although µ ≤ 1
2
ensures that bx > 0, nothing ensures that bx is less than one. When it is
greater than one, this region simply fails to exist and need not be analyzed.
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which is decreasing strictly in x, since µ ≤ 12 . Thus, M would choose the
smallest possible value of x in this region, at x = xnb.40
Intuitively, when M commits to a higher level of private beneÞts x > xnb,
she experiences two countervailing effects. First, M can expect a larger surplus
from forming a coalition with B (of which M will obtain a θ share). Because
of the inefficiency of expropriating private beneÞts, however, M will only enjoy
a µ fraction of her θ share of the increased surplus. Second, the increased
level of private beneÞt expropriation will raise the potential takeover proÞt to
B in the negotiation stage. To the extent B expects to beneÞt pro rata with
other shareholders from the takeover and not through Bs own private beneÞt
expropriation, B faces no inefficiency from appropriating private beneÞts. Even
where B expects to gain through the expropriation of his own private beneÞts,
because B takes into account the cost to the shares in Bs control block from
the expropriation, B will only take private beneÞts only where Bs efficiency is
relatively high (e.g., k > c). During the negotiation stage, managers seeking to
form a coalition must then compensate B for her foregone takeover proÞts due to
the higher level of private beneÞts x > xnb. The higher the level of inefficiency
in private beneÞt expropriation on the part of M (indicated through a lower
value of µ), the more likely the need to increase compensation to B outweighs
the gain to managers from the elevated private beneÞts.41
5.6 Equilibrium
Collecting all of the above analysis, we are now in a position to describe with
precision the equilibrium of the game when side payments are allowed. This
description is contained in Proposition 2, below.
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect equilibrium strategies and payoffs for the
game in which side payments between M and B are allowed are charac-
terized as follows:
 Commitment Stage: If θ ≤ xbxnb , then Player M sets x = xb. If
θ > xbxnb , then M sets x = xnb.
 Toehold Stage: If θ ≤ xbxnb , Player B assembles neither a toehold nor
a controlling share (i.e., γ = δ = 0). If θ > xbxnb , Player B assembles
a minimal toehold of δc.
 Bargaining Stage: If θ ≤ xbxnb , no bargaining occurs. If θ > xbxnb ,
M and B then reach a standstill agreement under which B receives a
40Although this interval has an open lower support, the continuity of M s payoff at xnb
implies that the value maximizing choice is x is at the lower limit of this region.
41A side note/caveat: If we were to relax the assumption that µ ≤ 1
2
, and supposed instead
that µ > 1
2
, then the above derivative could go the other way, in which case it would be
optimal for M to maximally expropriate the Þrm at x = 1. Indeed, when the coefficient on
x above is positive, it is also the case that bx = 1. Notice, however, that it makes sense from
an efficiency standpoint to exclude this possibility, since it would then be efficient for M to
maximally expropriate the Þrm (once you account for after tax payoffs). Only when µ ≤ 1
2
is
value diversion inefficient.
36
payment of (1− θ) ·
³
µV
(1+r)
´
xnb to refrain from additional acquisi-
tions.
 Takeover Stage: Player B purchases no additional shares, and thus
M retains control.
 Expropriation Stage: Player M expropriates the maximal amount pri-
vate beneÞts, setting xM = xb if θ ≤ xbxnb and xM = xnb if θ > xbxnb .
 Realization Stage: The total realized value of the Þrm is equal to
V · (1− xb) if θ ≤ xbxnb and V · (1− xnb) if θ > xbxnb .
 The expected payoffs of the parties are:
θ ≤ xbxnb θ > xbxnb
Initial SHs V(1+r) ·
¡
1
2 − xb2
¢
V
(1+r) ·
¡
1
2 − xnb2
¢
Player M µV(1+r) · xb θ ·
³
µV
(1+r)
´
xnb
Player B 0 (1− θ) ·
³
µV
(1+r)
´
xnb
Aggregate Surplus V(1+r)
¡
1
2 − xb
¡
1
2 − µ
¢¢
V
(1+r)
¡
1
2 − xnb
¡
1
2 − µ
¢¢
5.7 Observations and Discussion
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, it appears far from clear that the existence of
side payments hurts non-block shareholders or is inefficient. Indeed, as Propo-
sition 2 illustrates, so long as the block shareholder is a sufficiently powerful
bargainer against the manager (that is, θ is sufficiently small), the manager will
choose to commit to a value of x = xb that makes shareholders strictly better off
than they would be when side payments are disallowed. Moreover, even in situ-
ation where θ is large, collusion between the manager and the block shareholder
may do no worse than replicate the outcome that obtains when bargaining is
disallowed (x = xnb). This intuition directly generates the following:
Corollary 2.1 When θ ≤ xbxnb , both non-block shareholders and aggregate Þrm
value are largest if side payments are permitted. Conversely, when θ >
xb
xnb
, non-block shareholders and aggregate Þrm value are the same regard-
less of whether side payments are permitted.
Of course, the determination of whether side payments confer laudable ef-
Þciency beneÞts in practice may well come down to an empirical assessment
of bargaining power. Although such bargaining parameters are not easy to
measure in practice, we conjecture that there may be a few indirect means
of measuring the parties relative bargaining power. For example, in industries
where managers suffer signiÞcant reputational losses after a hostile takeover, the
block shareholder is likely to possess a large amount of bargaining power. Sim-
ilarly, the existence of well-capitalized block shareholders (such as institutional
investors) is another hallmark of signiÞcant bargaining power. Or alternatively,
the empirical frequency with side payments occur in the absence of regulation
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might be a good measure of the bargaining power block shareholders possess on
average.
Complicating the analysis is the fact that the beneÞcial effects of side
payments in Proposition 2 only occur off of the equilibrium path. Indeed, note
from the proposition that the spectre of side payments induces the manager
to select a modest level of private beneÞts, which deters the emergence of a
block shareholder completely. Opportunistic outside investors seeking to hold
up managers act as an ever present threat hanging over the heads of managers
in addition to the possibility of a takeover, much like the sword of Damocles.
Conversely, the actual execution of side payments occurs on the equilibrium
path, and each time a side payment is successfully made, it represents a loss to
shareholders. Consequently, it would be a mistake for scholars to attempt to
diagnose the overall effects of side payments by examining only those cases where
side payments are made. Indeed, our model predicts that in such instances, the
side payment does not make shareholders better off. However, our principal
argument is that off-equilibrium beneÞts of such transactions may well swamp
the equilibrium costs of them. Thus, in order to conduct a balanced and more
coherent analysis, scholars should keep in mind that observed bad effects of such
collusive transactions present them with a biased diagnostic sample.
6 Caveats and Extensions
Several caveats and extensions are possible to the analysis presented in this
paper. Without presenting a formal analysis, the section provides a brief dis-
cussion of them.
 Commitment to a maximal level of private beneÞts not binding on B.
Our model assumes that the manager may pre-commit to a maximal level of
private beneÞts that binds not only the manager but also the outside investor
that takes control of the corporation. Some forms of commitments, however,
may dissipate after a change in control. For example, to the extent the manager
relies on her own personal reputation as a commitment not to expropriate private
beneÞts, a change in control that replaces the manager will also remove the
commitment. Likewise, some Þrms may use the composition of the board of
directors to commit to a maximal level of private beneÞts, employing outside
directors with reputations for monitoring managers. With a change in control,
the outside investor often will have the ability to put in place its own slate of
directors.42
Where the manager adopts a commitment device that does not bind succes-
sors, our analysis is changed along at least two dimensions. First, the outside
investor faces a potentially greater return from engaging in a takeover. The
papers analysis indicates that part of the return an outside investor expects
42Note, nevertheless, that a staggered board structure reduces the ability of an outside
investor to change the composition of the board of directors immeditately. Instead, the
outside investor may have to wait years before obtaining majority control over the board.
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to receive from assembling a control block depends on the possibility that the
outside investor may extract his own high levels of private beneÞts. Where the
managers commitment to x also binds the outside investor, this commitment
reduces the expected return from extracting private beneÞts to the outside in-
vestor that obtains control. In contrast, when x is not binding, the outside
investor may obtain the full expected value from private beneÞt expropriation
when he obtains control. Facing a higher risk of a takeover, all other things
being equal, the manager will then face greater pressure to commit to a reduced
level of private beneÞts to the beneÞt of aggregate corporate welfare. So doing
can increase the price that existing shareholders would demand before they sell
out.
Second, however, a countervailing effect may occur (at least in the extreme).
As noted above, a non-binding value of x dramatically increases the block share-
holders return to an acquisition. It may simply be impossible for the manager
to deter a takeover, even by severely constraining herself. In such a case, the
manager can do nothing to prevent an acquisition of the Þrm. Thus, allowing
a commitment level that is not binding on successors has ambiguous effects on
our results.
 Timing of the commitment to a maximal level of private beneÞts
In the papers formal model, the manager makes the initial decision to com-
mit to a Þxed maximal level of private beneÞts x. SigniÞcantly, this decision is
made without any ability on the part of the manager to negotiate with the out-
side investor. Because managers must commit to x prior to negotiations with
a block shareholder, managers are put in a position of negotiating weakness.
Once a toehold block appears, for example, the toeholds threat to the manager
consists of undertaking a takeover. To the extent credible, the threat leaves
managers removed from control with zero rents. Zero rents, therefore, rep-
resents the bottom end of the negotiating range for managers seeking to form
a coalition with a toehold block, exposing much of the expropriated private
beneÞts for division with the toehold block.
A completely different negotiation game occurs where the manager is able to
negotiate with an outside investor prior to setting the maximal level of private
beneÞts x. The manager that negotiates prior to setting the maximal level of
private beneÞts may threaten to set x such that the outside investor will not
Þnd it proÞtable to form a toehold block at all (xb from the papers analysis
above). Even without an agreement, the lowest level of rents managers will
receive then is xb and not zero, establishing a higher lower bound for the man-
agers bargaining range with the block shareholder. The manager that forms
a coalition with the block shareholder then gains a greater share of the private
beneÞts expropriated and correspondingly is more likely to favor such coalitions
as opposed to deterring the formation of toehold blocks altogether.
Despite the possibility of the manager engaging in negotiations with the out-
side investor prior to making a pre-commitment to x, for many companies such
negotiations are infeasible. Many of the commitment devices are possible to im-
plement at only certain speciÞed times and moreover may not be instantaneous.
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Directors, for example, are elected at only certain times of the year. Taking
on more debt, likewise, can take time to put into effect. To negotiate with an
outside investor prior to making a commitment, therefore, managers must know
the identity of a potential acquirer before the acquirer assembles a toehold.43
Where shareholders are disperse, however, the manager will face large costs in
identifying outside investors that credibly have the ability and desire to assem-
ble a block. Talk is cheap. Any disperse shareholder may voice an intention to
assemble a block to receive a share of the managers private beneÞts of control.
The manager, therefore, may necessarily have to wait for a block actually to
form before commencing negotiations and therefore must make a commitment
to a particular level of private beneÞts prior to negotiations.
Where pre-existing blocks are present in the market, managers in fact may
have the ability to negotiate prior to committing to a maximal level of private
beneÞts. Policy makers, therefore, may wish to reduce prohibitions on oppor-
tunistic side payments to shareholders disproportionately for Þrms that lack the
presence of signiÞcant pre-existing blocks. As discussed below, nevertheless,
even where a pre-existing block is present, managers face the threat of other,
unknown outside investors forming new toehold blocks. So long as the pre-
existing block is not too large, the papers analysis on the beneÞcial ex ante
value of allowing opportunistic side payments to shareholders remains valid.
 Multiple potential block shareholders.
The papers formal model assumes the existence of only one outside investor
with the capability of assembling a block of shares. For any given company,
nevertheless, multiple outside investors with the capability of assembling a sig-
niÞcant block of shares may exist. A Þrms manager that seeks to form a
coalition with one toehold block, therefore, continues to face the risk that other
outside investors may form another toehold.
Where the supply curve for shares is upward sloping, a coalition between the
manager and the Þrst toehold block will raise the cost of to a second outside
investor of forming another toehold. Because the second toehold will also face
a higher cost of completing a full control block due to upward sloping supply
curve, the credibility of the second toeholds threat to engage in a takeover is
also reduced, all other things being equal. Nevertheless, in many situations,
the threat of a takeover on the part of a second toehold, may still be credible
and thereby force managers to enter into a coalition with the second toehold.
Where bargaining power is equal among all market participants, the presence
of a second toehold in the managers coalition forces managers to share the
surplus from private beneÞt expropriation three ways (among the manager, the
Þrst toehold, and the second toehold). Managers facing the need to share a
43The manager, of course, may simply choose not to commit to any maximal level of private
beneÞts prior to the formation of a toehold block. However, because implementing a com-
mitment devices takes time, managers will lack the ability to implement a new commitment
upon the entry of a block. The outside investor will therfore view a manager that fails to
commit as equivalent to a manager that commits to the highest possible maximal level of
private beneÞt expropriation (or x = 1 in the model).
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larger fraction of their private beneÞt surplus, therefore, are likely to favor even
more actions that deter the entry of any block of shares through the commitment
to the xb maximal level of private beneÞts.
7 Conclusion
Many view with skepticism the managerial practice of paying patronage to share-
holders in an effort to obviate an acquisition. Received wisdom holds that such
payments work to decrease the risk managers face from either a takeover or a
proxy contest, exacerbating agency costs by allowing them to expropriate higher
levels of private beneÞts, reducing the aggregate welfare of all corporate par-
ticipants. While other areas of law (such as Þduciary duties) also constrain
the ability of managers to extract beneÞts, litigation is costly to invoke and
likely snares only the most easily identiÞable transactions where managers ex-
tract a large amount of value. As such, shareholder patronage is thought to
render mute one of the most effective market forces of managerial discipline.
Courts and regulators have therefore responded with a series of prohibitions on
managerial favoritism. Managers, for example, may not declare a non pro rata
dividend to shareholders of the same class.44 Managers are also prohibited from
engaging in selective disclosures of non-public material information to favored
shareholders.45 Other examples abound.46
Received wisdom, however, is not always right. This paper has demon-
strated that allowing managers the ability to make even opportunistic payments
to curry the favor of large block shareholders may improve on aggregate cor-
porate welfare under plausible circumstances. Managers that form a coalition
with a large block shareholder may be able to expropriate signiÞcant value;
however, in doing so the manager must often share this beneÞt with the block
shareholder. Anticipating the size of the transfer payment needed to maintain
the coalition, a manager may prefer instead to commit to a reduced maximal
level of private beneÞts to deter the formation of blocks of shares altogether.
A signiÞcant virtue of the beneÞt that we have highlighted is that it is on-
going and persistent as the corporation evolves over time. Consequently, the
incentives providing by permitting favoritism do not require that corporate pro-
moters and enterepreneurs anticipate these incentive problems ex ante and draft
inßexible governance schemes or compensation plans to avoid them. Moreover,
the incentive structure we have highlighted remains even after a Þrm goes public
and shareholders are widely dispersed.
44 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170 (1998); Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.40. See 11
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corp. § 5352 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995); Edward P. Welch &
Andrew J. Turezyn, Folk on Delaware Corporation Law: Fundamentals § 170.2, at 340 - 41
(Little Brown ed. 1993).
45 In 2000, the SEC promulgated new rules under Regulation FD that greatly restricted the
ability of public corporations to make disclosures of non-public material information selectively
to favored analysts and shareholders. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Rel. No. 34-43154, Aug. 15, 2000, 2000 WL 1239722 (S.E.C.).
46 See Choi & Talley (2001) for a more complete description.
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9 Appendix
This appendix contains proofs for some of the results stated in the text.
Lemma 2. Suppose that B has an installed toehold of δ shares, and M has
committed to a maximal level of value expropriation, x. The unique equi-
librium of the Takeover-Stage subgame is as follows:
 If Ω (c, δ) > 0, B engineers a takeover by purchasing exactly γ = c shares
at price p (c) = V ·
³
(1−x)
1+r−rc
´
. In this case, the parties continuation
payoffs are:
(πM ,πB) = (0,Ω (c, δ)) .
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 If Ω (c, δ) ≤ 0, B does not engineer a takeover, and instead simply remains
at γ = δ. In this case, the parties continuation payoffs are:
(πM ,πB) =
µ
µxV
1 + r
, 0
¶
.
Proof:As in the no-bargaining analysis, consider three cases, corresponding
to sub-control, exact-control, and super-control block purchases by B, respec-
tively. Consider them ad seriatim.
Case 1: γ ∈ [δ, c) :
Consider Þrst whether B would have an incentive to purchase short of a
control stake (i.e., δ ≤ γ < c). Since a takeover would never occur here, Bs
beneÞt from such a purchase consists solely of his increased pro rata claim on
the Þrm, or (γ − δ) · (1−x)V1+r . On the other hand, the cost of this purchase would
be T (γ, δ) = (γ − δ) ·
³
(1−x)V
1+r(1−γ)
´
. The difference between these expressions
represents the net beneÞt of a sub-control purchase:
Ω (γ, δ|δ ≤ γ < c) = (γ − δ) · (1− x)V
(1 + r)
− (γ − δ) ·
µ
(1− x)V
1 + r − rγ
¶
= − (γ − δ) ·
µ
γr (1− x)
(1 + r) (1 + r − rγ)
¶
· V
Note that this expression is negative for any γ > δ, and thus B would strictly
prefer purchasing no additional shares (γ = δ) over purchasing additional shares
to a level that falls short of taking control.
Case 2: γ = c
This case is discussed at length in the text. Bs incremental gain from an
exact takeover is
Ω (c, δ) = Φ (c) + V · δ
µ
(1− x) rc
(1 + r − rc) (1 + r)
¶
If this expression is strictly positive, B would prefer an exact takeover to inac-
tion.
Case 3: γ > c.
Finally, consider a super-control share, where γ > c. Like in the no-bargaining
case, there is an upward discontinuity in price when purchasing γ > c shares,
since the marginal shareholder is no longer the pivotal one. As such, the price
to acquire a super-controlling interest is:
p (γ) = V ·
µ
γ + (1− γ) · (1− x)
1 + r − rγ
¶
> V ·
µ
(1− x)
1 + r − rc
¶
= p (c)
Using this pricing correspondence, Bs net payoff becomes:
Ω (γ, δ) = V ·
Ã
2γ + (1− γ)2 x
2 (1 + r)
− δ (1− x)
1 + r
!
−V ·
µ
γ + (1− γ) · (1− x)
1 + r − rγ
¶
(γ−δ)
(18)
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Differentiating Ω (γ, δ) with respect to γ yields:
d
dγ
Ω (γ, δ) = −V ·
Ã
γr2 (1− γ) (1− x+ γx) + γ2xr + r (γ − δx) + ¡r + r2 + x¢ (γ − δ)
(1 + r − γr)2 (1 + r)
!
< 0,
and consequently, B would never rationally raise his purchase above γ = c. B
would therefore constriain his actions to choosing between γ = δ and γ = c,
choosing the latter if and only if Ω (γ, δ) > 0. ¥
Lemma 3 The commitment level that deters a takeover when bargaining is pro-
hibited, xnb, is strictly greater than the unique commitment level that de-
ters the entry of a block shareholder when bargaining is allowed, xb.
Proof: From the expressions in the text, the net beneÞt associated with
purchasing a block of (slightly above) δc is given by:
(1− θ)µ ·
µ
xV
(1 + r)
¶
− (1− x)V ·
Ã
r · (δc)2
(1 + r − rδc) (1 + r)
!
(19)
= (1− θ)µ · x− r (δc)2 ·
µ
(1− x)
(1 + r − rδc)
¶
where δc = Max
½
0,
µ
2c2r−x((1+c2)(1+r)−(1−c)2(rc))
2rc(1−x)
¶¾
.If x > xnb, we know
that δc = 0, and (19) simpliÞes to (1− θ)µ ·x > 0, so there cannot be any roots
of (19) that are larger than xnb. Conversely, if x = 0, the expression in (19)
becomes −r (δc)2 ·
³
1
(1+r−rδc)
´
< 0, and thus B will never purchase a toehold.
Since (19) is continuous for all x ∈ [0, 1), it must have at least one root on
(0, xnb) . Solving (19) for x yields two roots, xhigh and xlow, which correspond
(respectively) to the (+) and (−) manifestations of the following:
2c2r
λrc + (1− θ)µ (1 + r − rc)
³
1±
q
1 + 2(1+c
2)(1+r)
(1−θ)µ(1+r−rc)
´
(λrc)
2 − (1− θ)µ
h
2rc (1− c)2 (1 + r − rc)
i

It is easily conÞrmed that xhigh > xnb, and thus from the above reasoning, this
root can be excluded. The lower root (xlow) is strictly less than xnb, and is the
solution reported in the text. Because it is the only root of (19) lying in[0, xb],
it is therefore the unique value of x that deters a toehold from being formed. It
is easily conÞrmed that xb ≡ xlow < xnb.¥
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